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Within the structural approach for credit risk models we discuss the optimal exercise of
the callable and convertible bonds. The Vasi˘ cek–model is applied to incorporate interest
rate risk into the ﬁrm’s value process which follows a geometric Brownian motion. Finally,
we derive pricing bounds for convertible bonds in an uncertain volatility model, i.e. when
the volatility of the ﬁrm value process lies between two extreme values.
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1 Introduction
Callable and convertible bonds have attracted substantial research attention due to their expo-
sure to both credit and market risk and the corresponding optimal conversion and call strategies.
The bondholder receives coupons plus the return of principal at maturity, given that the issuer
(usually the shareholder) does not default on the obligations. Moreover, prior to and at the
maturity the bondholder has the right to convert the bond into a given number of stocks. On
the other hand, the bond is also callable by the issuer, i.e. the bondholder can be enforced to
surrender the bond to the issuer for a previously agreed price. In the context of the structural
model the arbitrage free pricing problem was ﬁrst treated by Brennan and Schwarz (1977) and
Ingersoll (1977). Recent articles of Sirbu, Pilovsky and Schreve (2004) and Kallsen and K¨ uhn
(2005) treat the optimal behavior of the contract partners more rigorously. The valuation of
callable and convertible bond is explicitly related to the game option.
Empirical research indicates that ﬁrms that issue convertible bonds often tend to be highly
leveraged, the default risk may play a signiﬁcant role. Moreover, the equity and default risk
cannot be treated independently and their interplay must be modeled explicitly. Default risk
models can be categorized into two fundamental classes: ﬁrm’s value models or structural models,
and reduced-form or default-rate models. In the structural model, one constructs a stochastic
process of the ﬁrm’s value which indirectly leads to default, while in the reduced-form model
the default process is modeled directly. In the structural models default risk depends mainly
on the stochastic evolution of the asset value and default occurs when the random variable de-
scribing the ﬁrm’s value is insuﬃcient for repayment of debt. Instead of asking why the ﬁrm
defaults, in the reduced-form model formulation, the intensity of the default process is mod-
eled exogenously by using both market-wide as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, such as stock prices
and default intensities. While both approaches have certain shortcomings, the strength of the
structural approach is that it provides economical explanation of the capital structure decision,
default triggering, inﬂuence of dividend payments and of the behaviors of debtor and creditor.
1It describes why a ﬁrm defaults and it allows for the description of the strategies of the debtor
and creditor. Especially for complex contracts where the strategic behaviors of the debtor and
the creditor play an important role, structural models are well suited for the analysis of the
relative power of shareholders and creditors. Another reason that we work with the structural
approach is because it allows for an integrated model of equity and default risk through common
dependence on stochastic variables.
Callable and convertible bonds are American-style contract, meaning that conversion is allowed
at any time during the life of the contract, and by existence of a call provision for the issuer
this leads to a problem of optimal stopping for both bondholder and issuer. Therefore when we
compute the no-arbitrage price of such a contract, we have to take into account the aspect of
strategic optimal behaviors which are the study focus of this paper. Based on the results of Kifer
(2000) and Kallsen and K¨ uhn (2005) we show that the optimal strategy for the bondholder is
to select the stopping time which maximizes the expected payoﬀ given the minimizing strategy
of the issuer, while the issuer will choose the stopping time that minimizes the expected payoﬀ
given the maximizing strategy of the bondholder. This max-min strategy of the bondholder leads
to the lower value of the convertible bond, whereas the min-max strategy of the issuer leads to
the upper value of the convertible bond. The assumption that the call value is always larger than
the conversion value prior to maturity T and they are the same at maturity T ensures that the
lower value equals the upper value such that there exists a unique solution. The no-arbitrage
price can be approximated numerically by means of backward induction. In absence of interest
rate risk, the recursion procedure is carried out on the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial lattice.
To incorporate the inﬂuence of the interest rate risk, we use a combination of an analytical
approach and a binomial tree approach developed by Menkveld and Vorst (1998) where the
interest rate is Gaussian and correlation between the interest rate process and the ﬁrm’s value
process is explicitly modeled. We show that the inﬂuence of interest rate risk is small. This can
be explained by the fact that the volatility of the interest process is in comparison with that
of the ﬁrm’s value process relatively low, moreover, both parties have the possibility of early
exercise.
In practice it is often a diﬃcult problem to calibrate a given model to the available data. Here
one major drawback of the structural model is that it speciﬁes a certain ﬁrm’s value process. As
the ﬁrm’s value, however, is not always observable, e.g. due to incomplete information, deter-
mining the volatility of this process is a non-trivial problem. In this paper, we circumvent this
problem by applying the uncertain volatility model of Avellaneda, Levy and Par´ as (1995) and
combining it with the results of Kallsen and K¨ uhn (2005) on game option in incomplete market
to derive certain pricing bounds for convertible bonds. Hereby we only known that the volatility
of the ﬁrm’s value process lies between two extreme values. The bondholder selects the stopping
time which maximizes the expected payoﬀ given the minimizing strategy of the issuer, and the
expectation is taken with the most pessimistic estimate from the aspect of the bondholder. Thus
the optimal strategy of the bondholder and his choice of the pricing measure determine the lower
bound of the no-arbitrage price. Whereas the issuer chooses the stopping time that minimizes the
expected payoﬀ given the maximizing strategy of the bondholder. This expectation is also the
most pessimistic one but from the aspect of the issuer, thus the upper bound of the no-arbitrage
price can be derived. Numerically, to make the computation tractable a constant interest rate is
assumed. The pricing bounds can be calculated with recursions on a recombining trinomial tree.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model framework:
market assumptions, dynamics of the interest rate and ﬁrm’s value processes, capital structure
and the default mechanism are established. The contract feature of the callable and convertible
2bond is described in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the description of the optimal strategies
and the determination of the no-arbitrage value of the callable and convertible bond. The
formulation and solution of the optimization problem are ﬁrst presented with constant interest
rate in Section 5, then the interest rate risk is incorporated in Section 6. In Section 7 uncertain




We adopt a ﬁrst passage model and the model assumptions are made mainly according to Briys
and de Varenne (1997) and Bielecki and Rutkowski (2004)1, with some slight modiﬁcations. It
covers both the ﬁrm speciﬁc default risk and the market interest rate risk and correlation of them.
The ﬁnancial market is frictionless, which means there are no transactions costs, bankruptcy
costs and taxes, and all securities in the market are arbitrarily divisible. Every individual can
buy or sell as much of any security as he wishes without aﬀecting the market price. Risk-free
assets earn the instantaneous risk-free interest rate. One can borrow and lend at the same
interest rate and take short positions in any securities. The Modigliani-Miller theorem is valid,
i.e. the ﬁrm’s value is independent of the capital structure of the ﬁrm. In particular, the value
of the ﬁrm does not change at the time of conversion and is reduced by the amount of the call
price paid to the bondholder at the time of the call. Trading takes place continuously. Under
these assumptions, the ﬁnancial market is complete, and according to Harrison and Kreps (1979)
there exists a unique probability measure P∗ under which the continuously discounted price of
any security is a P∗-martingale.
2.2 Dynamic of the ﬁrm’s value
The Vasi˘ cek–model, in its simplest form, a one-factor mean-reverting model is applied to incor-
porate interest rate risk into the process of the ﬁrm’s value. The conform short rate follows an
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process
dr(t) = (ar − brr(t))dt + σrdW∗
1(t), (1)




rate of br . W∗
1(t) is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion under the martingale measure
P∗. Accordingly, the value of a default free zero coupon bond B(t,T) follows the dynamic
dB(t,T) = B(t,T)(rtdt − b(t,T)dW∗
1(t)) (2)





The ﬁrm’s value V is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion under the martingale
measure P∗ of the form
dVt
Vt





1See, Section 3.4 of their book.
3where W∗
2(t) is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion, independent of W∗
1(t) and ρ ∈
[−1,1] is the correlation coeﬃcient between the interest rate and the ﬁrm’s value. The volatility
σV > 0 and the payout rate κ are assumed to be constant. The amount κVtdt is used to pay
coupons and dividends.
Under the martingale measure P∗ the no-arbitrage price of a contingent claim is derived as
expected discounted payoﬀ, but in the case of stochastic discount factor the calculation can be
quite complicated. The calculation can be simpliﬁed if the T-forward risk adjusted martingale
measure PT is applied.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A T-forward risk adjusted martingale measure PT on (Ω,FT) is equivalent

















and when restricted to the σ−ﬁeld Ft ,
dPT















Especially for Gaussian term structure model, when the zero bond price is given by Equation
(2), an explicit density function exists. Namely,
dPT





















follows a standard Brownian motion under the forward measure PT .
Thus the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value FV (t,T) := Vt/B(t,T) satisﬁes the following dynamics
under the T-forward risk adjusted martingale measure PT 2,
dFV (t,T)
FV (t,T)
= −κdt + (ρσV + b(t,T))dWT




= −κdt + σF(t,T)dWT(t), (5)
where WT







V + 2ρσV b(u,T) + b2(u,T)
 
du, (6)
and WT(t) is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion that arises from the independent
Brownian motions WT
1 (t) and W∗
2(t) 3 by the following equality in law aWT
1 (t) + bW∗
2(t) ∼ √
a2 + b2WT(t), where a,b are constant. Thus the auxiliary process
Fκ
V (t,T) := FV (t,T)eκt (7)
2The dynamic of the forward ﬁrm value is derived by application of Itˆ o’s Lemma.
3The independence of W
T
1 (t) and W
∗
2 (t) is due to the assumption that W
∗
1 (t) and W
∗
2 (t) are independent
and this property remains after the change of measure acted on W
∗
1 (t) .
4is a martingale under PT and is log-normally distributed. Speciﬁcally, we have
dFκ
V (t,T) = Fκ
V (t,T) · σF(t,T)dWT(t). (8)
According to Equation (3) a constant payout rate of κ is assumed, and κVtdt is the sum of the
continuous coupon and dividend payments. Thus the ﬁrm’s value FV (t,T) is not a martingale
under the T-forward risk adjusted martingale measure PT , but after compensated with the
payout, the auxiliary process Fκ
V (t,T) is a martingale under PT.
2.3 Capital structure and default mechanism
The equity price may drop at time of conversion, as the equity-holders may own a smaller
portion of the equity after bondholders convert their holdings and become new equity-holders.
To capture this eﬀect, we assume that until time of conversion, at time t, the ﬁrm’s asset
consists of m identical stocks with value St and of n identical callable and convertible bonds
with value CCBt, thus
Vt = m · St + n · CCBt.
Especially, at time t = 0, the initial ﬁrm’s value satisﬁes
V0 = m · S0 + n · CCB0. (9)
Moreover, we set the principal that the ﬁrm must pay back at maturity T to be L for each
bond and assume that bondholders are protected by a safety covenant that allows them to
trigger early default. The ﬁrm defaults as soon as its value hits a prescribed barrier and the
default time τ is deﬁned in a standard way by
τ = inf {t > 0 : Vt ≤ νt}. (10)
3 Contract Feature
In the following we assume that the bond matures at time T ∈ R+. The coupons are paid
out continuously with a constant rate of c, given that the ﬁrm’s value is above the level ηt .
The contract terminates either at maturity T or, in case of premature default, at the default
time τ, which is the ﬁrst hitting time of the barrier νt by the ﬁrm’s value. Moreover, the
contract stops also by conversion or call. The bondholder can stop and convert the bond into
equities according to the prescribed conversion ratio γ. The conversion time of the bondholder
is denoted as τb ∈ [0,τ]. The shareholder can stop and buy back the bond at a price given by
the maximum of the deterministic call level Ht and the current conversion price. This ensures
that the payoﬀ by call is never lower than the conversion payoﬀ. This assumption makes the
aspect of game option relevant and interesting for the valuation of callable convertible bonds.
The call time of the seller is denoted as τs ∈ [0,τ].
3.1 Discounted payoﬀ
First, we introduce the notation β(s,t) = exp{−
  t
s r(u)du} which is the discount factor, where
r(t) is the instantaneous risk-free interest rate. The discounted payoﬀ of a callable and convert-
ible bond can be distinguished in four cases.
(i) Let τb < τs ≤ T, such that the contract begins at time 0 and is stopped and converted by
the bondholder. In this case, the discounted payoﬀ conv(0) of the callable and convertible














(ii) Let τs < τb ≤ T, such that the contract is bought back by the shareholder before the
bondholder converts. In this case, the discounted payoﬀ call(0) of the callable and con-
















(iii) If τs = τb < T the discounted payoﬀ of the bond equals the smaller value, i.e. the
discounted payoﬀ with conversion.































































Denote the minimum of conversion and call time byζ = τs ∧τb. Then, all in all, the discounted
payoﬀ of a callable and convertible bond ccb(0) is given as the sum of the payoﬀs in the former




































3.2 Decomposition of the payoﬀ
The callable and convertible bond can be decomposed into a straight bond component and an
option component. The decomposition enables us to investigate the pure eﬀect caused by the
conversion and call rights.
Theorem 3.1. The payoﬀ of a callable and convertible bond can be decomposed into a straight
bond d(0) and a defaultable game option component g(0).























































is the discounted value (discounted to time ζ ) of the sum of the remaining coupon payments
and the principal payment of a straight coupon bond given that it has not defaulted till time ζ .






















































≥ L if ζ ≤ T, otherwise the bondholder would not make use of his conversion right.
2
4 Optimal Strategies
After the inception of the contract, the bondholder’s aim is to maximize the value of the bond
by means of optimal exercise of the conversion right. The incentive of the issuer to call a bond
is to limit the bondholder’s participation in rising stock prices. The embedded option rights
owned by both of the bondholder and issuer can be treated with the well developed theories on
the game option.
4.1 Game option
In this section we summarize the valuation problem of game options and highlight some impor-
tant results derived by Kifer (2000). .
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let T ∈ R+. Consider a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft)t∈[0,T],P). A
game option is a contract between a seller A and a buyer B which enables A to terminate
it and B to exercise it at any time t ∈ [0,T] up to the maturity date T. If B exercises at
time t, he obtains from A the payment Xt. If A terminates the contract at time t before it
is exercised by B, then he has to pay B the amount Yt, where Xt and Yt are two stochastic
processes which are adapted to the ﬁltration (Ft)t∈[0,T] , and satisfy the following condition
Xt ≤ Yt, for t ∈ [0,T], and XT = YT. (17)
Moreover, if the seller A terminates and the buyer B exercises at the same time, A only has to
pay the lower value Xt. Loosely speaking, the seller must pay certain penalty if he terminates
the contract before the buyer exercises it.
Game options include both American and European options as special cases. Formally, if we set
Yt = ∞ for t ∈ [0,T), then we obtain an American option. A European option is obtained by
setting Xt = 0 for t ∈ [0,T) and XT is a nonnegative FT-measurable random variable.
8If the seller A selects a stopping time τA as termination time and the buyer B chooses a
stopping time τB as exercise time, then A promises to pay B at time τA ∧ τB the amount
g(τA,τB) := XτB1{τB≤τA} + YτA1{τA<τB}, (18)
which denotes the payoﬀ of a game option.
The aim of the buyer B is to maximize the payoﬀ g(τA,τB), while the seller A tends to mini-
mize the payoﬀ. The optimal strategy for the buyer is therefore to select the stopping time which
maximizes his expected discounted payoﬀ given the minimizing strategy of the seller, while the
seller will choose the stopping time that minimizes the expected discounted payoﬀ given the
maximizing strategy of the buyer. This max-min strategy of the buyer leads to the lower value
of the game option, whereas the min-max strategy of the seller leads to the upper value of the
game option. In a complete market the condition described by Equation (17) ensures that the
lower value equals the upper value such that there exists a solution for the pricing problem of a
game option.
The existence and uniqueness of the no-arbitrage price in a complete market where the ﬁltration
{Fu}0≤u≤T is generated by a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion is proved in Kifer











where F0T is the set of stopping times with respect to the ﬁltration {Fu}0≤u≤T with values in
[0,T]. After the inception of the contract, the value process G(t), t ∈ (0,T] satisﬁes
G(t) = esssupτB∈FtTessinfτA∈FtTEP∗[e−r(τA∧τB)g(τA,τB)|Ft] (20)
= essinfτA∈FtTesssupτB∈FtTEP∗[e−r(τA∧τB)g(τA,τB)|Ft].
Where FtT is the set of stopping times with values in [t,T]. Further, the optimal stopping
times for the seller A and buyer B respectively are
τ∗
A = inf{t ∈ [0,T] | e−rtYt ≤ G(t)}
τ∗
B = inf{t ∈ [0,T] | e−rtXt ≥ G(t)}. (21)
It is optimal for the seller A to buy back the option as soon as the current exercise value e−rtYt
is equal to or smaller than the value function G(t), while the optimal strategy for the buyer B
is to exercise the option as soon as the current exercise value e−rtXt is equal to or greater than
the value function G(t).
4.2 Optimal stopping and no-arbitrage value of callable and convertible bond
The discounted conversion value of the callable and convertible bond, described with Equation
(11), contains expressions about default times. But in the structural approach, the default
time is a predictable stopping time, and adapted to the ﬁltration (Ft)t∈[0,T] generated by the
ﬁrm’s value. Thus the discounted conversion value is adapted to the ﬁltration (Ft)t∈[0,T] . And
the same is valid for the discounted call value and the discounted terminal payoﬀ, described
with Equations (12) and (13) respectively. Moreover, the call value is always larger than the
conversion value for t < T , and they coincide at maturity T . Hence, the payoﬀs in the case
9of conversion and call satisfy the requirements on the payoﬀs of the game option. Furthermore,
the market in our structural approach is assumed to be complete. Therefore the theory on game
option developed by Kifer (2000) can be applied to derive the unique no-arbitrage value and the
optimal strategies.
Proposition 4.2. Plugging the payoﬀ functions ccb(0) in Equation (19), the unique no-










After the inception of the contract, the value process CCB(t) satisﬁes
CCB(t) = esssupτb∈FtTessinfτs∈FtTEP∗[ccb(0)|Ft] (23)
= essinfτs∈FtTesssupτb∈FtTEP∗[ccb(0)|Ft].
The optimal strategy for the bondholder is to select the stopping time which maximizes the
expected payoﬀ given the minimizing strategy of the issuer, while the issuer will choose the
stopping time that minimizes the expected payoﬀ given the maximizing strategy of the bond-
holder. This max-min strategy of the bondholder leads to the lower value of the convertible
bond, whereas the min-max strategy of the issuer leads to the upper value of the convertible
bond. The assumption that the call value is always larger than the conversion value prior to the
maturity and they are the same at maturity T ensures that the lower value equals the upper
value such that there exists a unique solution.
Furthermore, the optimal stopping times for the equity holder and bondholder respectively are
τ∗
b = inf{t ∈ [0,T] | conv(0) ≥ CCB(t)}
τ∗
s = inf{t ∈ [0,T] | call(0) ≤ CCB(t)}. (24)
It is optimal to convert as soon as the current conversion value is equal to or larger than the
value function CBB(t), while the optimal strategy for the issuer is to call the bond as soon as
the current call value is equal to or smaller than the value function CBB(t).
Remark 4.3. The no-arbitrage value of the callable and convertible bond and the optimal
stopping times described by Equation (22) and (24) incorporate also the case of stochastic
interest rate. Kifer (2000) assumes that the interest rate is constant, but this assumption is
not necessary, because the game option is essentially a zero-sum Dynkin stopping game and the
min-max and max-min strategies are also valid for the stochastic discount factor. For details,
see e.g. Kifer (2000) and Cvitani´ c and Karatzas (1996).
In section 3.2 it has been shown that the callable and convertible bond can be decomposed into
a straight bond and a game option component
ccb(0) = d(0) + g(0).
Therefore the no-arbitrage price of the callable and convertible bond can also be derived in the
following way
CCB(0) = EP∗[d(0)] + EP∗[g(0)].











105 Deterministic Interest Rates
In general, closed-form solutions of the optimization problems stated in Equations (22) and (25)
are not available. One alternative solution is to approximate the continuous time problem with
a discrete time one. The no-arbitrage value of the callable and convertible bond can then be
derived by a recursion formula. In order to focus on the recursion procedure, we assume in the
ﬁrst step that the interest rate is constant. Theorem 2.1 of Kifer (2000) illustrates the recursion
method for the game option and the optimal stopping strategies of both counterparts. The
discretization method and its convergence is proved in Proposition 3.2 of the same paper. We
will apply and adapt this recursion method to determine the no-arbitrage value and optimal
stopping times of the callable and convertible bond.
5.1 Discretization and recursion schema
The time interval [0,T] is discretized into N equidistant time steps 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN =
T , with ti −ti−1 = ∆. Assume that the bondholder does not receive the coupon for the period
in which the bond is converted, while receives the dividends for the converted shares, though.
If the bond is called, coupon will be paid. CCB(tn), the recursion value of the callable and
convertible bond at time tn , can be derived by means of the max-min or min-max recursion,
illustrated in Figure 1 and 2. Note that in complete markets the max-min strategy leads to
the same value as the min-max strategy. Hence it does not matter whether we carry out the
recursion according to the strategy of the bondholder or that of the shareholder. In the recursion
schema Vt+
n is the ﬁrm’s value just before payout and νtn is the default barrier. The discretized
coupon ctn equals c∆, and will only be paid out if the ﬁrm’s value is above certain level, i.e.
Vt+
n > ηtn , therefore ctn is path-dependent.
For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
CCB(tn) =

       









































, L + ctN
 
if VT + > n(L + ctN)
e−rT VT +
n
if VT + ≤ n(L + ctN)
(27)
Figure 1: Min-max recursion callable and convertible bond, strategy of the issuer
11For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
CCB(tn) =

       









































, L + ctN
 
if VT + > n(L + ctN)
e−rT VT +
n
if VT + ≤ n(L + ctN)
(29)
Figure 2: Max-min recursion callable and convertible bond, strategy of the bondholder
Furthermore, for each i = 0,1,...,N − 1, the rational conversion time after time ti equals
τ∗
b (ti) = min
 
tk ∈ {ti,...,tN−1}

























Therefore at time tk , it is optimal to convert or call when the current conversion or call value
equals the payoﬀ function CCB(tk).
Remark 5.1. For convenience of notation, the call value H is assumed be constant, but the
same recursion formulas also hold in the case of a deterministic and time dependent call level
H(t). In that case H has to be replaced by H(t+
n) in the above formulas.
Analogously, the no-arbitrage value of the pure game option component G(tn) at time tn can
be derived through the recursion shown in Figure 3 with φtn as discretized value deﬁned by
Equation (16).
5.2 Implementation with binomial tree
As the ﬁrm’s value in our structural model follows a geometric Brownian motion, in absence
of interest rate risk, it can be approximated by the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model. The time
interval [0,T] is divided in N subintervals of equal lengths, the distance between two periods
is ∆ = T/N. The stochastic evolution of the ﬁrm’s value is then modeled by




∆, d = e−σV
√
∆, ˆ κ = e−κ∆,
where V (i,j) denotes the ﬁrm’s value at time ti after j up movements, and less the amount
to be paid out. And according to Equation (30), the ﬁrm’s value just before the payment equals
V (i,j)
ˆ κ
, and the total amount to be paid out at time ti is V (i,j)
ˆ κ
1 − ˆ κ
. We see that u,d
12For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
G(tn) =

      




































          











































− L − cN,0
 
if VT + > n(L + cN)
0 if VT + ≤ n(L + cN)
Figure 3: Max-min and min-max recursion game option component
and ˆ κ are time and state independent. The equivalent martingale measure P∗ exists if the
periodical discount factor d < 1 + ˆ r = er∆ < u. The transition probability is given by
p∗ :=
1 + ˆ r − d
u − d
.
Concretely, the recursion procedure of the min-max strategy 4 of the issuer of a callable and
convertible bond, described by Equations (26) and (27), can be implemented within the Cox-
Ross-Rubinstein model with Algorithm I (Figure 4). The no-arbitrage price of the callable and
convertible bond is then given by CCB(0,0).
The ﬁrst loop in Algorithm I (Figure 4) determines the optimal strategy and thus the optimal
terminal value CCB(N,j). While the second loop determines the value of CCB(i,j) according
to the min-max strategy at node (i,j) of the tree. The value of each CCB(i,j) is stored in
a data matrix, and the event of conversion, call or continuation of the contract is recorded for
each node (i,j). Then given the development, i.e. the path of the ﬁrm’s value V (i,j), the
bondholder and issuer can determine their optimal stopping times by moving forward alongside
the tree. At the time the contract is terminated, i.e. converted, called or default at the node
(i,j), CCB(i,j) is then the discounted payoﬀ of the callable and convertible bond for this
realization of the ﬁrm’s value.
5.3 Inﬂuences of model parameters illustrated with a numerical example
The no-arbitrage value of the callable and convertible bond is aﬀected by the randomness of
the ﬁrm’s value, and the randomness of the termination time. It is a complex contract and
4The algorithm of max-min strategy and recursion of the best strategy of the game option component can be
written in the similar way, therefore we omit these cases.




> nL + ncN,j,










n · ˆ κ
for i = N − 1,...,0,
for j = i,...,0,





















1 + ˆ r
 
p∗ · CCB(i + 1,j)








n · ˆ κ
Figure 4: Algorithm I: Min-max recursion American-style callable and convertible bond
inﬂuenced by a number of parameters: e.g. the value of coupon and principal, default barrier,
volatility of the ﬁrm’s value, conversion ratio, call level, maturity, etc. The ﬁrm’s value in total
follows a diﬀusion process, while the bond and equity value are results of a strategic game, which
are not simple diﬀusion processes. Change of one parameter causes simultaneous changes of the
value of bond and equity. For example, intuitively, the increment of the conversion ratio causes
the rise of conversion value, thus the rise of the bond price, but at the same time the reduction
of the equity value, and consequently the decline of the conversion value. The direction and
quantity of the total eﬀect cannot be determined without numerical evaluation. Moreover, to
design a meaningful callable and convertible bond, the parameters should in accordance with
each other. The situation such that the bond will be converted or called immediately after the
start of the contract, should not happen. In the following, we will illustrate the inﬂuences of the
model parameters and their interactions with a close study of a numerical example.
Example 5.2. As an explicit numerical example we choose the following parameters: T =
8, σV = 0.2, r = 0.06, V (0) = 1000, K = 400, ω = 1300, L = 100, γ = 1.5, m = 10, n =
8, H = 120.
The results in Table 1 are derived for diﬀerent payout ratios κ and coupons c 5. They illustrate
ﬁrst that the value of the game option component decreases when coupon payment rises. The
reason is that the value of the remaining coupon and principal payment deﬁned by Equation (16)
can be thought as the strike of the game option, which is an increasing function of coupon rate
c, and the value of the game option component decreases in strike. The large price diﬀerence of
game option component G(0) in the case κ = 0, c = 0, to the case κ = 0.04, c = 2 is due to
5The coupons are to be paid if the ﬁrm’s value is above ηt = ω · e
−r(T−t)e




14σV = 0.2 σV = 0.4
κ c SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0) SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0)
0 0 59.40 16.92 76.32 38.94 48.01 26.85 74.86 40.11
0.04 2 65.15 8.65 73.80 40.96 52.38 20.41 72.79 41.77
0.04 3 69.83 7.82 77.65 37.88 56.39 18.72 75.12 39.91
0.04 4 74.50 6.99 81.50 34.80 60.40 17.03 77.44 38.06
Table 1: Inﬂuence of the volatility of the ﬁrm’s value and coupons on the no-arbitrage price of
the callable and convertible bond (384 steps)
the increment of payout ratio and coupon rate. Both factors together result in a large drop of
the value of G(0). The second eﬀect shown by Table 1 is that the more volatile the ﬁrm’s value,
the larger the default probability, hence the smaller the value of straight bond SB(0). But on
the other side the game option component G(0) becomes more valuable. In our example, the
value of the callable and convertible bond CCB(0) which is the sum of the both components
decreases in volatility6.
σV = 0.2 σV = 0.4
∆ SB(0) CCB(0) G(0) SB(0) CCB(0) G(0)
1 69.37 77.00 7.64 54.30 73.83 19.54
1/12 69.82 77.65 7.82 56.14 75.12 18.96
1/48 69.83 77.64 7.81 56.39 75.12 18.72
1/100 69.83 77.64 7.81 56.45 75.11 18.66
1/250 69.83 77.64 7.81 56.51 75.12 18.61
Table 2: Stability of the recursion
Remark 5.3. The stability of the recursion is demonstrated with Table 2. The recursions are
carried out alongside trees with diﬀerent steps for σV = 0.2 and σV = 0.4. We can see that the
numerical results stabilized at ∆ = 1/48. Further reﬁnements (∆ = 1/100 and ∆ = 1/250) of
the tree do not change the numerical results considerably while much more time are needed for
the calculation. Therefore, for the further calculations in this example ∆ is always set to be
1/48, which approximately corresponds to a weekly valuation. By ∆ = 1/48 and a maturity of
T = 8 it corresponds to a tree with 384 steps.
Table 3 has the same structure as Table 1 and shows the inﬂuence of the conversion ratio γ on
G(0) and CCB(0). The volatility of the ﬁrm’s value is kept to be constant, i.e. σV = 0.2.
The change of conversion ratio γ does not aﬀect the price of the straight coupon bond and
it only changes the value of G(0). The increase of γ from 1.5 to 2.0 makes the game option
component more valuable, thus in total the callable and convertible bond more valuable7. The
case by κ = 0.04, c = 2 and γ = 2 is not a good contract design. As with CCB(0) = 78.27,
and S(0) = 37.38, the initial price of the bond is almost equal to the initial conversion value,
which means that the conversion may take place very quickly after the inception of the con-
tract, because a slight increase of the ﬁrm’s value will make conversion the optimal choice of the
6In Example 5.2, the value of the callable and convertible bond increases in volatility, but one cannot argue it
generally, as it depends also on other factors e.g. default barrier and maturity.
7Again we cannot take it as a general result, as it depends also on the parameters m and n .
15γ = 1.5 γ = 2
κ c SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0) SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0)
0 0 59.40 16.92 76.32 38.94 59.40 22.96 82.35 34.12
0.04 2 65.15 8.65 73.80 40.96 65.15 13.12 78.27 37.38
0.04 3 69.83 7.82 77.65 37.88 69.83 11.71 81.54 34.77
0.04 4 74.50 6.99 81.50 34.80 74.50 10.39 84.90 32.08
Table 3: Inﬂuence of the conversion ratio on the no-arbitrage price of the callable and convertible
bond (384 steps)
bondholder. Usually it is not the intention of the issuer to issue a bond which will be converted
or called immediately after the inception of the contract.
T = 8 T = 6
κ c SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0) SB(0) G(0) CCB(0) S(0)
0 0 59.40 16.92 76.32 38.94 67.21 11.91 79.12 36.71
0.04 2 65.15 8.65 73.80 40.96 71.75 6.22 77.97 37.62
0.04 3 69.83 7.82 77.65 37.88 75.57 5.75 81.33 34.94
0.04 4 74.50 6.99 81.50 34.80 74.50 5.27 84.67 32.26
Table 4: Inﬂuence of the maturity on the no-arbitrage price of the callable and convertible bond
(384 steps)
Table 4 is also structured in the same way as Tables 3 and 1. It demonstrates the inﬂuence of
the maturity T on G(0) and CCB(0). The volatility of the ﬁrm’s value and conversion ratio
are σV = 0.2 and γ = 1.5. Comparing the case T = 8 with T = 6, we observe that the
straight bond is more valuable with shorter maturity, because the default probability is lower
and by positive interest rate the principal is more valuable if it is paid earlier. The game option
component G(0) is less valuable in the case of shorter maturity. It is due to two eﬀects: ﬁrst,
shorter maturity means less conversion chances for the bondholder, and secondly, an increase of
the value of the straight bond reduces the value of the equity thus the conversion value. The
reduction of G(0) may in turn increase the value of equity, here the ﬁnal result is that reduction
in maturity increases the value of the callable and convertible bond CCB(0).
The value of the game option component can be restricted when the call level is reduced. This
eﬀect is conﬁrmed by the results in Table 5. The reduction of the call level is achieved by making
the call level to be time dependent
H(t) = e−ω(T−t)H, ω ≥ 0. (31)
The value of H(t) increases in time and reaches H at maturity T. By ω = 0, the call level
reaches its maximum and is a constant H . The impact of the call level on the no-arbitrage price
of game option component is stronger in the case of higher coupon rate c and lower volatility
of the ﬁrm’s value σV .
16κ c ω = 0,σV = 0.2 ω = 0.04,σV = 0.2 ω = 0,σV = 0.4 ω = 0.04,σV = 0.4
0 0 16.92 14.84 26.85 24.40
0.04 2 8.65 7.67 20.41 19.00
0.04 4 6.99 3.64 17.03 13.58
Table 5: Inﬂuence of the call level on the no-arbitrage price of the game option component (384
steps)
6 Stochastic Interest Rate
6.1 Recursion schema
In this section we solve the optimization problems stated in Equations (22) and (25) by allowing
stochastic interest rate. Similar as in Section 5, the continuous time problem is approximated
with a discrete time one and the no-arbitrage value is derived by a recursive formula. We
discretize the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value process modeled in Section 2.2. Accordingly, the
call level and coupons are adjusted to the forward value. The recursion is carried out on the
T -forward adjusted values, see Figure 5, where FV (t+
n,T) is the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value
just before payout and CCBF(tn) is the T -forward value of the callable and convertible bond
at time tn . At the terminal date T , FV (T,T) = VT thus CCBF(T) = CCB(T). νtn is the
default barrier. The coupon ctn will only be paid out if the ﬁrm’s value is above certain level, i.e.
Vt+
n > ηtn . The no-arbitrage price of the callable and convertible bond equals B(0,T)CCBF(0).
For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
CCBF(tn) =

            







































, L + ctN
 
if VT + > n(L + ctN)
VT +
n
if VT + ≤ n(L + ctN)
(33)
Figure 5: Min-max recursion callable and convertible bond, T -forward value
6.2 Some conditional expectations
The recursion formula, Equation (32) contains both FV (tn,T) and B(tn,T) as variables. In
order to circumvent a two-dimensional tree, we solve CCBF(tn,T) as conditional expectation
given FV (tn,T). To achieve the analytical closed-form solution, we ﬁrst explore the relationship
between FV (t,T) and B(t,T).
17According to the assumptions on the ﬁrm’s value made in Section 2.2, under PT the auxiliary
forward price of the ﬁrm’s value Fκ
V (t,T) and the T -forward price of the default free zero
coupon bond FB(t,s,T) :=
B(t,s)
B(t,T)
, t ≤ s < T are both martingales, and satisfy
dFκ
V (t,T) = Fκ
V (t,T) · σF(t,T)dWT
t .





















t are two correlated standard Brownian motion with constant coeﬃcient of corre-
lation equals ρ.
Hence Fκ






are bivariate normally distributed and







V + 2ρσV b(s,T) + b2(s,T))ds
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ρσV (b(u,T) − b(u,t)) + (b(u,t)b(u,T) − b(u,t)2)
 
du.
Given these relationships the expectation and variance of lnB(t,T) conditional on the forward























Therefore, conditional on lnFκ




V (t,T) = ¯ w
 
= µ3 + σ3x
8For details see Menkveld and Vorst (2000).
18where x is a standard normal random variable. Thus the following conditional expectation can
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= p · e−µ3+
σ2
3
2 N(h + σ3) − q · N(h) (37)
with h = (ln(p/q) − µ3))/σ3 for some p,q ∈ R+. Here, N(·) denotes the cumulative distribu-
tion function of a standard normal distribution.
6.3 Implementation with binomial tree
For the implementation of the recursion schema displayed in Figure 5 we apply the method
developed by Menkveld and Vorst (1998) which is a combination of an analytical approach and
a one-dimensional binomial tree approach. A simple recombining binomial tree for the forward
price FV (t,T) := Vt/B(t,T) of the ﬁrm’s value can be constructed with the trick that the
interval [0,T] is not divided into periods of equal length, but into periods of equal volatility.
Recursion is then carried out alongside the T -forward risk adjusted tree. The interval [0,T] is








V + 2ρσV b(s,T) + b2(s,T))ds.
The stochastic evolution of the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value is then modeled by
FV (n,j) = F(0)ujdn−jˆ κn, ∀j = 0,...,n, n = 1,...,N
with F(0) = V (0)/B(0,T) and
u = eσN
F , d = e−σN
F , ˆ κn = e−κ∆n, ∆n = tn − tn−1,
where FV (n,j) denotes the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value after payout, at time tn after j
up-movements. F(0) is the initial forward price of the ﬁrm’s value. The expressions show that
u and d are time and state independent. ˆ κn is time dependent as the time steps are no longer
of equal length. The (time dependent) coupon payment is given by c(n) = c∆n. The forward





Thus the conditional expectation in the recursion schema can be calculated as
EV (n,j) := pT · CCBF(n + 1,j) + (1 − pT) · CCBF(n + 1,j + 1)




1 − ˆ κn
.
19At each node (n,j) we calculate the expected value of the min-max strategy under the measure
PT conditional on the available information FV (n,j). The calculation is tedious but can be
solved analytically. We make ﬁrst some simpliﬁcations of the notations which are only used for




EV := EV (n,j)












































B(tn,T)>CV }1{EV + c
B(tn,T)>CV }. (38)
Equation (38) can be further calculated in two cases.
(i) CV ≤ EV


















(ii) CV > EV


























According to the conditional expectations given in Equations (36) and (37), the analytical
solution of Equations (39) and (40) can be derived as conditional expectations given Fκ
V (n,j) =
FV (n,j)eκtn = ¯ w .
(i) CV ≤ EV





















20(ii) CV > EV

























And µ3 and σ3 have been deﬁned in Equations (34) and (35).
In the following numerical example we compute the no-arbitrage price of a callable and convert-
ible bond with stochastic interest rates.
Example 6.1. The initial term structure is ﬂat, choose T = 8, σV = 0.2, K = 400, ω =
1300, σr = 0.02, b = 0.1, V (0) = 1000, L = 100, K = 400, m = 10, n = 8, H = 120, γ =
1.5, r0 = 0.06. 9 The recursions are carried out alongside a tree with 384 steps.
The no-arbitrage prices of a straight bond, a callable and convertible bond and the game option
component in American-style with and without stochastic interest rates are presented in Table
6. “Non” stands for no interest rate risk, “-0.5” and “0.5” give the correlation coeﬃcient of the
interest rate and ﬁrm’s value. The values are derived for diﬀerent payout and coupon combina-
tions.
G(0) CCB(0) SB(0)
κ c Non −0.5 0.5 Non −0.5 0.5 Non −0.5 0.5
0 0 16.92 15.80 19.07 76.32 76.00 76.49 59.40 60.21 57.41
0.04 2 8.65 7.42 9.97 73.80 73.97 73.40 65.15 66.56 62.35
0.04 4 6.99 6.03 8.88 81.05 82.09 80.29 74.50 76.06 71.41
Table 6: No-arbitrage prices of the non-convertible bond, callable and convertible bond and
game option component in American-style with stochastic interest rate (384 steps)
Increasing correlation between the interest rate and the ﬁrm’s value causes increasing volatility
of the forward price of the ﬁrm’s value. The default probability rises with increasing volatility,
which results in a reduction of the value of the straight bond SB(0). But on the other side, the
value of the game option component G(0) increases in volatility. Therefore in general the total
eﬀect is uncertain, in our concrete example the total value declines with increasing correlation.
Moreover, the inﬂuence of the interest rate risk is relatively small which is recognized by the
value of the convertible bond, the results listed in the columns under CCB(0).
9The default barrier is ηt = KB(t,T)e
−κt , and the coupons are to be paid if the ﬁrm’s value is above
ηt = ωB(t,T)e
−κt .
217 Uncertain Volatility of Firm Value
In practice it is often a diﬃcult problem to calibrate a model to the available data. Here one
major drawback of the structural model approach is that it speciﬁes a certain ﬁrm’s value pro-
cess. As the ﬁrm’s value, however, is not always observable, e.g. due to incomplete information,
determining the volatility of this process is a non-trivial problem. Moreover, the interest rate
risk and the uncertainty about the correlation of the interest rate and ﬁrm value process are
other contributors to the uncertainty of the volatility.
To relax the assumption of constant volatility of the ﬁrm’s value, one can specify volatility as
a particular function of the ﬁrm’s value, or model volatility itself with a stochastic process.
However, speciﬁcation of a reasonable model for the volatility dynamics and precise estimation
of the parameters would be a diﬃcult task. We circumvent these problems by assuming that
the volatility of the ﬁrm’s value process lies between two extreme values. The volatility is no
longer assumed to be constant or a function of underlying and time. It is instead assumed to
lie between two extreme values σmin and σmax, which can be viewed as a conﬁdence interval
for the future volatilities. This assumption is less stringent compared to the approaches where
the volatility is modeled as a function of the underlying or as a stochastic process. It needs also
less parameter inputs.
We treat the callable and convertible bond with uncertain volatility by applying the model of
Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons (1995) and combining it with the results of Kallsen and
K¨ uhn (2005) on game option in incomplete market such that certain pricing bounds can be
derived. The bondholder selects the stopping time which maximizes the expected payoﬀ given
the minimizing strategy of the issuer, and the expectation is taken with the most pessimist
estimate from the aspect of the bondholder. The optimal strategy of the bondholder and his
choice of the pricing measure determine the lower bound for the no-arbitrage price. Whereas
the issuer chooses the stopping time that minimizes the expected payoﬀ given the maximizing
strategy of the bondholder and the expectation is also the most pessimist one but from the aspect
of the issuer, thus the upper bound of the no-arbitrage price can be derived. The volatility is
selected dynamically from the two values σmin and σmax in a way that always the one with the
worse eﬀect, thus the most pessimist pricing measure is chosen.
7.1 Uncertain volatility model
The uncertain volatility model is ﬁrst proposed independently by Avellaneda et al. (1995) and
Lyons (1995). It is an extension of the Black-Scholes framework to deal with the biased estimate
of the historical volatility or the smile eﬀect of the implied volatility10. Avellaneda et al. (1995)
study the case of derivatives written on a single underlying asset. The volatility of the asset
is not assumed to be a constant or a function of the underlying or rather stochastic. Instead,
it is only assumed to lie between two extreme values σmin and σmax, which can be viewed as
a conﬁdence interval for the future volatilities. This assumption is less stringent compared to
other approaches and it needs also less parameter inputs. The derivation of a no-arbitrage pric-
ing bound is based on a super-hedging strategy which is a worst case estimation. At each (t,x)
the volatility is selected dynamically from the two values σmin and σmax in a way that always
the one with the worse eﬀect on the value of the derivative from aspect of seller or buyer is chosen.
For a given martingale measure Q, suppose the stock price evolves according to the following
10The volatility implied from the traded options, plotted as a function of the strike price, often exhibits a
speciﬁc U-shape, which is referred to as the smile eﬀect.
22dynamic
dSt = St(rdt + σtdW∗
t ),
where, for simpliﬁcation the interest rate r is assumed to be constant. The super-hedge, i.e.




















∂S2 = 0, (41)
with terminal value f(S,T) = F(S), andΣ2[x] stands for a volatility parameter which depends
on x, the convexity of function f . For example, the super-hedge price for the seller of a call






max if x ≥ 0
σ2
min else.
The authors provide also a simple algorithm for solving the equation by a trinomial tree and
prove the convergence of this discrete scheme. In case of vanilla European options, the pricing
bounds can be derived simply with the Black-Scholes equations using the extreme values of the
volatility parameter, thus the nonlinear solution is reduced to the linear Black-Scholes solution.
Lyons (1995) treats the case of derivatives written on multiple assets. The volatility is assumed to
lie in some convex region depending on the prices of the underlying and time. Same as Avellaneda
et al. (1995), the volatility matrix is chosen such that the worst eﬀect on the derivative is
achieved. However, vanilla European options written on multi-assets, in general, cannot be
derived simply by using the extreme values of the volatility parameter. Moreover, it is only
possible under particular conditions to reduce the nonlinear solution to the linear Black-Scholes
solution.
7.2 No-arbitrage pricing bounds
The relax of the assumption of deterministic volatility and the adoption of the uncertain volatil-
ity introduce market incompleteness. There would be a set of possible equivalent martingale
measures which are compatible with the no arbitrage requirement. The holder and issuer of a
callable and convertible bond must not only decide their optimal stopping strategies but also
the proper pricing measure.
This problem has been considered by Kallsen and K¨ uhn (2005) in context of game option in
incomplete market. Theorem 2.2 of their paper tells us that: suppose that only a buy-and-hold
strategy is allowed in the game option, while the underlying risky asset and the savings account
can be traded dynamically, the set of initial no-arbitrage prices is determined by super hedging















where Q is the family of equivalent martingale measures, F0T is the set of stopping times
with respect to the ﬁltration {Fu}0≤u≤T with values in [0,T], and g(τA,τB) is deﬁned in
Section 4.1 by Equation (18). The bondholder selects the stopping time which maximizes the
23expected payoﬀ given the minimizing strategy of the issuer, and the expectation is taken with
the most pessimistic estimate from the aspect of the bondholder. The optimal strategy of the
bondholder and his choice of the pricing measure determine the lower bound of the no-arbitrage
price. Whereas the issuer chooses the stopping time that minimizes the expected payoﬀ given
the maximizing strategy of the bondholder. This expectation is also the most pessimistic one
but from the aspect of the issuer, thus the upper bound of the no-arbitrage price can be derived.
Suppose that the callable and convertible bond is not traded dynamically, applying the results
from the theory of game option which are given in Equations (42) and (43), the set of initial
















where Q is the family of equivalent martingale measures, F0T is the set of stopping times with
respect to the ﬁltration {Fu}0≤u≤T with values in [0,T], cbb(0) is deﬁned in Section 3.1 by
Equation (14).
7.3 Discretization and recursion schema
The upper and lower bound CCBup(0) and CCBlow(0) can be approximated with the recur-
sions demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7.
For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
CCBup(tn) =

       








































, L + ctN
 
if VT + > n(L + ctN)
e−rT VT +
n
if VT + ≤ n(L + ctN)
Figure 6: Recursion: upper bound for callable and convertible bond
7.4 Implementation with trinomial tree
To make the computation tractable, we make some simpliﬁcations on the ﬁrm’s value process
and the default mechanism deﬁned in Section 2. The interest rate r, the payout rate κ and the
default barrier K are assumed to be constant. The volatility of the ﬁrm’s value lies between
two extreme values σmin and σmax which are two constant. The ﬁrm’s value process can thus
be described with the following diﬀusion process
dVt = Vt((r − κ)dt + σtdWt)
24For n = 0,1,...,N − 1,
CCBlow(tn) =

       









































, L + ctN
 
if VT + > n(L + ctN)
e−rT VT +
n
if VT + ≤ n(L + ctN)
Figure 7: Recursion: lower bound for callable and convertible bond
and
σmin ≤ σt ≤ σmax.
Avellaneda et al. (1995) provide also a simple algorithm for solving the Black-Scholes-Barenblatt
equation by a trinomial tree. According to this discretization, the time interval [0,T] is divided
in N subintervals of equal lengths. The distance between two periods is ∆ = T/N. After
each period ∆, the ﬁrm’s value will go up, in the middle way, or down, and then has the
corresponding value




∆+(r−κ)∆, m = e(r−κ)∆, d = e−σmax
√
∆+(r−κ)∆.
The so constructed tree is recombining because m2 = u · d. The stochastic evolution of the
ﬁrm’s value is then modeled by
V (n,j) = V (0) · ej·σmax
√
∆+n·(r−κ)∆, ∀j = 0,...,2n, n = 1,...,N,
where V (n,j) denotes the ﬁrm’s value at time tn := n∆ in state j. At time tn+1 there are
three possible nodes conditional on (n,j) : in case of an up-movement we have (n + 1,j + 1),
in case of a down-movement (n+1,j−1) and in case of the middle way (n+1,j). Thus higher
j indicates a higher ﬁrm’s value at time tn. V (0) is the initial ﬁrm’s value. The transition
probability for the up- and down-movement is, respectively, given by
















pm(p) = 1 − 2p
where the parameter p varies in the range σ2
min/(2σ2
max) ≤ p ≤ 1/2. 11 This condition ensures
that the uncertain volatility σ takes values such that σmin ≤ σ ≤ σmax. The trinomial tree
11The transition probabilities depend on p because otherwise we would have a deterministic volatility model.
25has one degree of freedom at each node, thus the choice of risk-adjusted probabilities is not
unique. This freedom is used to model heteroskedasticity. For p = 1/2, highest probabili-
ties are assigned to the extreme nodes u and d which yields the largest volatility. While for
p = σ2
min/(2σ2
max) highest probability is assigned to center node m, thus the lowest volatility is
achieved. Therefore, by ﬁxing u, d and m and allowing the risk-adjusted probabilities to vary
over a one-dimensional set, a range of variances within the volatility band [σmin,σmax] can be
modeled.
Deﬁne




EV −(tn) := inf
Q∈Q
EQ[CCBup(tn+1)|Ftn],





CCBup(n + 1,j) +
1
2
Z+(n + 1,j) if Z+(n + 1,j) > 0











CCBlow(n + 1,j) +
1
2
Z−(n + 1,j) if Z−(n + 1,j) < 0





Z−(n + 1,j) if Z−(n + 1,j) ≥ 0
where Z+(n + 1,j) and Z−(n + 1,j) are the approximations of the second-derivative and are
deﬁned as










)CCBup(n + 1,j − 1)
− 2CCBup(n + 1,j)










)CCBlow(n + 1,j − 1)
− 2CCBlow(n + 1,j).
7.5 Illustration with a numerical example
Example 7.1. Let T = 8, σmin = 0.2, σmax = 0.4, V = 1000, L = 100, K = 300, m =
10, n = 8, H = 120, γ = 1.5, r = 0.06. In Table 7 the call level is kept constant with H while
in Table 8 the call level is time dependent with
H(t) = e−w(T−t)H, w = 0.04.
The pricing bounds of the callable and convertible bonds with uncertain volatility which lies
in the interval [0.2,0.4] are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. These price bounds are compared
with the results if they are calculated with the extreme values of the volatility. Since we chose
a relatively wide range of volatilities, σmin = 0.2 and σmax = 0.4, the price diﬀerential of
the lower and upper bound is relatively large. Moreover, the lower (upper) bounds are smaller
(larger) than the results calculated with extreme volatilities.
The reduction of the call level is achieved in Table 8 by making it time dependent. Comparing
the results in Tables 7 and 8, we see that both lower and upper bound are lower in Table 8.
26κ c σV ∈ [0.2,0.4] σV = 0.2 σV = 0.4
0 0 73.68 78.67 76.33 74.90
0.04 2 69.20 75.70 73.81 71.60
0.04 3 71.23 79.22 77.66 73.35
0.04 4 73.20 82.94 81.50 75.08
Table 7: Pricing bounds callable and convertible bond with uncertain volatility and constant
call level H (384 steps)
κ c σV ∈ [0.2,0.4] σV = 0.2 σV = 0.4
0 0 71.97 75.06 74.25 72.37
0.04 2 69.04 73.56 72.83 70.57
0.04 3 70.26 76.24 75.51 71.49
0.04 4 71.20 78.94 78.16 72.41
Table 8: Pricing bounds callable and convertible bond with uncertain volatility and time depen-
dent call level H(t) (384 steps)
It is intuitive as the callable and convertible bond is less valuable by a lower call level. The
reduction of the call level has larger impact on the upper bound. For example, for κ = 0.04 and
c = 4, the lower bound goes from 73.20 to 71.20 while the upper bound drops from 82.94 to 78.94.
8 Conclusion
Modeling of the callable and convertible bond as a defaultable game option within structural
approach has been studied by Sirbu et al. (2004) and further developed in a companion paper
of Sirbu and Schreve (2006). In their models the volatility of the ﬁrm’s value and the inter-
est rate are constant. The bond earns continuously a stream of coupon at a ﬁxed rate. The
dynamic of the ﬁrm’s value does not follow a geometric Brownian motion, but a more general
one-dimensional diﬀusion due to the ﬁxed rate of coupon payment. Default occurs if the ﬁrm’s
value falls to zero which means both equity and bond have zero recovery. The no-arbitrage price
of the bond is characterized as the result of a two-person zero-sum game. Viscosity solution
concept is used to determine the no-arbitrage price and optimal stopping strategies. Our model
diﬀers from theirs mainly by allowing non-zero recovery rate of the bond and default occurs
if the ﬁrm’s value hit a low but positive boundary. The dynamic of the ﬁrm’s value follows a
geometric Brownian motion which means that the underlying process, the evolution of the ﬁrm’s
value, does not depend on the solution of the game option. Therefore the results of Kifer (2000)
can be applied to the valuation of the bond. Simple recursion with a binomial tree can be used
to derive the value of the bond and the optimal strategies. Moreover, stochastic interest rate
and uncertain volatility can be incorporated into our model.
Our idealized model illustrates how the optimal strategies work and what are the important
underlying factors. For practical use other features have to be taken into account. For example,
a ﬁrm issues usually several diﬀerent kinds of debt with diﬀerent priorities. Convertible bonds
are usually junior debt. The mutual dependence of the diﬀerent debts and stocks must also be
modeled. We derived pricing bounds for convertible and callable bonds under the assumption
that the volatility of the ﬁrm value process lies between two extreme values. The pricing bounds
27can be improved if a narrower conﬁdence interval of the volatility of the ﬁrm value is avail-
able. Otherwise we need more knowledge of the risk preferences of the bondholder and issuer.
Randomization of the strategies and partial exercises could be the subject of the future study.
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